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 Abstract: An important task for metaphysicians and philosophers of science is to account for laws of 
 nature – in particular, how they distinguish themselves from ‘mere’ regularities, and the modal force they 
 are endowed with, ‘natural necessity’. Dispositional essentialism about laws (for short: ‘essentialism’) is 
 roughly the view that laws distinguish themselves by being grounded in the essences of natural entities 
 (e.g. kinds, properties). This paper does not primarily concern how essentialism compares to its main 
 rivals – Humeanism and Armstrongeanism. Rather, it distinguishes and comparatively assesses 
 various  brands of essentialism – which mainly differ as to where exactly they take laws to find their 
 essentialist sources (e.g. in particular entities, like electrons, or in larger pluralities of entities, or in the 
 world as a  whole), and what they take to be the targets of laws, namely what they apply to. Yet, this 
 internal  comparison is not unrelated to the more general debate about laws: the main criteria with which 
 I compare these essentialist views concern how they can deal with some of the main objections faced by 
 essentialism in general (the modal status it typically attributes to laws, which some think is too strong; 
 and its alleged incapacity to account for the most 'general' laws, like conservation laws), and how they 
 can keep what is  arguably the main intuitive advantage of essentialism over its rivals (the fact that, on 
 this view, things  “govern themselves”). Thus, the paper also concerns the relative position of 
 essentialism in the larger debate about laws – ultimately bringing support to it.  
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One major task for metaphysicians and philosophers of science is to account for laws of nature – in 
particular, their specificity with respect to other regularities, and their modal force, known as ‘nomic’ 
or ‘natural’ necessity. There are three dominant families of views about laws of nature.1 On broadly 
Humean accounts (after Hume 1740), laws are contingent generalizations that distinguish themselves 
by meeting some (epistemic or practical) criteria – simplicity, strength and balance, on the notorious 
“best-system” account (Lewis 1973). On what I will call Armstrongeanism, laws are generalizations that 
correspond to relations of “contingent necessitation” between relevant universals (Dretske 1977; Tooley 
1977; Armstrong 1983). For a large part of the last century, those two approaches dominated 
philosophical debates on laws. It is only a few decades ago that dispositional essentialism (for short: 
essentialism) emerged as a new approach (Harré & Madden 1975; Shoemaker 1980; Swoyer 1982; Ellis 
2001; Molnar 2003; Mumford 2004; Lowe 2006; Bird 2007a; Heil 2012). On this view, laws distinguish 
themselves from other generalizations by being true in virtue of the essences of natural entities (e.g. 
kinds, properties).2  
In this paper, I will not primarily be concerned with how essentialism compares to its main rivals. Rather, 
I want to distinguish and comparatively assess various brands of essentialism – which mainly differ as 
to where exactly they take laws to find their essentialist  sources (e.g. in particular entities, like 
electrons, or in larger pluralities of entities, or in the world as a whole), and what they take to be the 
targets of laws, namely what they apply to. However, this comparison within essentialism will not be 
unrelated to the more general debate about laws: the main criteria that I will rely on to assess these 
brands of essentialism concern how they can deal with some of the main objections faced by essentialism 
in general (the modal status it typically attributes to laws, which some think is too strong; and its alleged 
incapacity to account for the most 'general' laws, like conservation laws), and how they can keep what 
is arguably the main intuitive advantage of essentialism over its rivals (the fact that, on this view, things 
“govern themselves”). Thus, by arguing that a certain kind of view within the essentialist family is 
particularly well fitted to meet these crucial challenges, I will also, more generally, bring support to 
essentialism as a candidate approach to laws of nature. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next part (§2), I first present essentialism as one of the 
main three approaches to laws of nature, pointing out some of its main potential advantages and 
disadvantages with respect to its rivals. In this light, I then suggest three criteria to comparatively assess 
 
1 Though arguably the leading ones, the three approaches considered here are of course not the only available ones. 
In particular, while representing very different overall accounts of laws (e.g. as regards modal status), all three are 
reductionist accounts; yet, there are also primitivist views (e.g. Maudlin 2007), and eliminativist views (for two 
eliminativist views based on radically different grounds (roughly, Humean and dispositionalist motivations, 
respectively), see Van Fraassen 1989, and Mumford 2005). 
2 Some may prefer to reserve the term “entity” for substances, as opposed to e.g. properties. In this paper, for 




the various brands of essentialism to be considered: extensional accuracy; modal status of the laws; 
ability to preserve the intuition that things govern themselves. In part §3, based on those criteria, I 
compare two views which differ as to where they take laws to find their essentialist source – in the world 
as a whole (“global essentialism”) or in more specific entities within the world (“local essentialism”). 
In part §4, I argue that, with respect to the criteria considered, what crucially matters to a comparative 
assessment, beyond the essentialist source of laws, is their target (what they apply to), especially the 
relation between their source and target. Accordingly, I consider a view that I call “coordinated 
essentialism”, on which every law has the same entities (whether local or global) as both its source and 
target. My main conclusions will be that, if one is to be an essentialist at all, one should probably be a 
local essentialist rather than a global one, and anyway a coordinated essentialist rather than a non-
coordinated one. 
2. The Dispositional Essentialist Approach to Laws of Nature 
2.1. Dispositional Essentialism and its Main Rivals 
Before considering different brands of dispositional essentialism, I will quickly describe the context of 
the larger debate about laws of nature. Beyond setting up the general background for the discussion to 
come in later sections, the main purpose of this brief and partial overview is to identify some of the main 
features that distinguish essentialism from its main rivals (whether potential advantages or 
disadvantages), as those should in turn be particularly relevant to a comparative assessment within 
essentialism – the idea being that the best form of essentialism should be the one that can best deal with 
the objections against this approach, and preserve its main advantages. As suggested earlier, taking those 
criteria as a basis, my internal comparative assessment of different brands of essentialism will ultimately 
also be relevant to an external comparative assessment of essentialism and its non-essentialist rivals: if 
it can be shown that a particular view within the essentialist family does particularly well in those 
respects, which are crucial to essentialism’s relative position in the larger debate about laws, it also 
brings support to essentialism more generally.  
First of all, the dispositional essentialist approach distinguishes itself from its main two rivals by being 
based on a radically different fundamental ontology: one where (at least some of the) fundamental 
entities are dispositions, or powers3  – as opposed to categorical properties.4 There is a huge and still 
ongoing debate on Humean versus dispositional metaphysics, both having their alleged virtues and 
 
3 Note that, among dispositionalists, some have argued for the stronger view that all fundamental properties are 
dispositional, thus adopting “pandispositionalism” (e.g. Shoemaker 1980; Bird 2007a). Others have defended the 
view that some fundamental properties are dispositional, while other ones are categorical (e.g. Ellis 2001). Still 
other ones have argued that properties are neither categorical nor dispositional (in the pure, exclusive sense), but 
in some sense both categorical and dispositional (see e.g. Martin 1997; Mumford 1998; Heil 2003). I will leave 
these finer-grained ontological distinctions aside in this paper – as far as I can see at least, they should not be 
crucial to the particular aspects of dispositional essentialist views of laws on which I will focus here (although 
they clearly do matter for other aspects of those views). 
4 On the categorical/dispositional distinction, see e.g. Armstrong, Martin & Place 1996; Mumford 1998. 
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drawbacks. On the one hand, with fundamental entities as dispositions, dispositionalists can account for 
causation, laws and other modal phenomena without having to postulate mere possible worlds; modality, 
as it were, is already “contained” in the actual world. Moreover, if fundamental entities are dispositional, 
it makes it easier for us to know them, at least assuming that what we have epistemic access to is the 
dispositional or causal behaviour of fundamental entities – e.g. electrons having the disposition to repel 
each other when in proximity. Yet, dispositions, precisely because they can be seen as “modal” entities, 
have faced various attacks, like the notorious charge of “meinongeanism”, to the effect that such entities 
lack “reality” (see Armstrong 1997: 79-80; Bird 2007b; Lowe 2006). Accordingly, categoricalism – the 
ontological background for both Humeanism and Armstrongeanism – avoids those problems. However, 
by having all fundamental entities as purely categorical, it faces difficulties when it comes to 
determining the identity of those entities. First, a metaphysical issue: their identity may be doomed to 
be purely “quidditistic”, a mere “thisness” (see Armstrong 1989; Bird 2005a; Kistler 2002). For instance, 
unlike dispositionalists, categoricalists deny that electrons have their dispositional properties (e.g. the 
disposition to repel other negatively charged particles) as part of their identity; on categoricalism, in 
another possible world, electrons might have had a different dispositional behaviour (e.g. the actual 
behaviour of protons), while still being electrons. Yet – the objection goes on –, if dispositions are 
excluded from electrons’ identity, it seems difficult to say what this identity consists in – except the 
brute, trivial property of being electrons (a “quiddity”). Second, categoricalism faces a related epistemic 
issue: assuming that all we have epistemic access to is dispositional (all we can know is the causal roles, 
not what plays those roles), but fundamental properties are purely categorical, we are doomed to 
“epistemic humility”, a position of radical of ignorance about the fundamental level of the world (e.g. 
Shoemaker 1980: 215; Lewis 2001: 204, 211).  
What will be of more direct interest to us is how, on the basis of those different fundamental ontologies, 
the three dominant views considered here account for laws. Three important, and somehow related, 
problems are the distinction problem (How do laws distinguish themselves from mere regularities?), the 
explanation problem (How can laws explain the corresponding regularities?), and the modal status 
problem (What is the modal force that laws seem to be endowed with?). As I said earlier, on Humeanism, 
laws distinguish themselves from other regularities with mainly epistemic, or practical, criteria – as 
Lewis recognized, whether those criteria give us the “real” laws of nature depends on whether nature is 
kind to us (see Lewis 1973: 74; Lewis 1994: 479). Thus, there seems to be no “robust”, metaphysical 
difference between laws and other regularities. As regards explanation, on the Humean picture, the 
regularities that we observe in the world are not to be explained by laws – or by anything else. Those 
regularities, and more generally the distribution of fundamental properties in spacetime, are to be 
accepted as brute. Finally, the modal force that laws seem to be endowed with is only apparent according 
to Humeanism: in the last analysis, laws are as contingent as other regularities.  
4 
 
Arguably, those three features of Humeanism are at odds with widely shared pre-theoretical intuitions 
about laws. It seems that laws do distinguish themselves from other regularities in a metaphysically 
robust way: there is something in the world that makes the claim that electrons repel when in proximity 
significantly different from the claim that there is no gold sphere with a diameter greater than 17 
kilometres. It also seems that laws do explain the corresponding generalizations: electrons repel each 
other in the whole spacetime because it is a law of nature. Finally, laws do seem to have some form of 
necessity attached to them: electrons do not happen to consistently repel each other; there is a sense in 
which they have to – while there is no sense in which gold spheres have to be less than 17 kilometres in 
diameter.  
Amstrongeanism differs from Humeanism in those three important respects. It does not face the 
distinction problem, at least not in the same way: laws involve a second-order ‘contingent necessitation’ 
relation between the relevant universals, whereas mere regularities do not. Laws are also supposed to 
explain the corresponding regularities: the fact that electrons and protons attract each other everywhere 
in spacetime does not have to be accepted as brute – it is explained by the corresponding law of nature, 
in the form of a relation between the universals involved. Finally, Amstrongeanism can account for the 
intuition that there is a modal force attached to laws: although laws are not metaphysically necessary, 
they are not simply contingent either; they have a sui generis modal force – what Armstrong calls 
“contingent necessitation”. While Amstrongeanism may be taken to have an advantage in those three 
respects, it has faced important objections concerning both the identification of this sui generis modal 
force (what exactly it amounts to), and the ability of the relations of ‘contingent necessitation’ between 
universals to really explain the corresponding regularities (see van Fraassen 1989: 96; Lewis 1983: 366; 
Armstrong 1993; Bird 2005c).   
On the three issues considered, dispositional essentialism is closer to Armstrongeanism than to 
Humeanism. It has a clear answer to the identification problem: laws are true in virtue of the essences 
of natural entities, while other true regularities are not. The essences of natural entities is also what 
explains the regularities corresponding to laws: electrons always repel because it is in their very nature. 
Finally, unlike Humeanism, essentialism can easily account for the impression that laws are endowed 
with a modal force: laws are metaphysically necessary, because they are essential to certain natural 
entities. Moreover, unlike Amstrongeanism, essentialism does not have to postulate any sui generis 
modal force (and face the corresponding difficulties). On the other hand, the strong modal force that 
essentialism attributes to laws is seen by many as a potential problem: on pre-theoretical intuitions, 
unlike mathematical theorems, laws of nature may not seem to be metaphysically necessary. In 
particular, many take counter-nomic scenarios where some natural entities do not behave according to 
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the actual laws of nature (e.g. electrons attracting each other) to be conceivable and, correspondingly, at 
least prima facie metaphysically possible.5  
Another core criterion to assess accounts of laws is extensional accuracy: in particular, the laws given 
by the account should also be laws according to our common-sense, pre-theoretical intuitions6, informed 
by science and scientific practise – and vice versa. The main problem facing essentialism in that respect 
is what I call the problem of “missing entities”: on essentialism, all laws are supposed to be best 
understood as being true in virtue of the essence of some natural entities; yet, it has been argued that 
some laws (e.g. conservation and symmetry laws) are too “general” to be understood as being true in 
virtue of any specific natural entities – meaning that essentialism is extensionally incomplete (see 
Bigelow, Ellis & Lierse 1992;  Bird 2005b: §7.2; Fine 2002). It is worth pointing out here that, although 
the problem of missing entities has been discussed as a challenge for essentialism in particular, 
Armstrongeanism faces the same problem: if no particular entities (e.g. kinds, properties) can be 
identified as those relevant to ground a given “general” law of nature, then presumably it will also be 
difficult for the Armstrongean to understand that law as a relation between particular universals. As 
regards Humeanism, it does not seem to face the particular problem of “missing entities”, but it faces 
extensional problems of its own, closely related to its difficulty in resolving the distinction problem: 
various cases have been put forward where a law may come out as a theorem of the “best system” 
without being plausibly a law of nature, and vice versa (see e.g. Tooley 1977: 669; Maudlin 2007: 67; 
Effingham, Beebee & Goff 2010: 59-60) 
A final way in which the three leading views considered here importantly differ is how they account for 
the widely shared intuition that the world is in some sense “dynamic”: a unified collection of things 
which may move, interact with each other, undergo and bring about genuine change. Arguably, 
Humeanism has difficulties accounting for that intuition: fundamentally, the Humean world is an 
atomistic mosaic of unrelated events; we may derive, at a higher level, notions of causation, movement 
or change from this mosaic, but fundamentally things in the world are static and epiphenomenal – 
nothing is really changing, or moving, or bringing about anything. On Armstrongeanism, things are in 
a sense dynamic, but not by themselves: they have to be governed “from the outside”, by laws. Yet, 
arguably, none of those two views really does justice to our intuitions about the world – whether our 
naïve, common sense picture of it, or the picture that science suggests. When an object falls on the 
 
5 For now, I will focus on this first sort of scenario (where some actual entities obey different laws) as a potential 
objection to essentialism. A second sort of allegedly counter-nomic but metaphysically possible scenario is one 
involving non-actual, or ‘alien’, entities. As I will argue in §4.2, the latter sort of scenario, which has also been 
used as an objection against necessitarian views of laws, amounts to a different objection, requiring a different sort 
of answer: while essentialists should accept that the first sort of scenario is indeed counter-nomic, but deny that it 
is metaphysically possible, they should accept that the second sort of scenario is indeed metaphysically possible, 
but insist that it is not counter-nomic, and perfectly compatible with essentialism. 
6 By “pre-theoretical intuitions”, I mean intuitions that are (as much as possible) prior to, or not assuming, any 
particular metaphysical theory of laws (e.g. Humeanism or essentialism).  
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ground as I drop it, or when two electrons repel, for instance, it looks like things being dynamic. And 
they seem to be dynamic by themselves: they do not need a God to manipulate them, as on older theories 
of the natural world; nor do they need to be manipulated from the outside by what seems to have replaced 
God in more recent theories, namely abstract laws à la Armstrong – relations of “contingent 
necessitation” which, happening to hold in this world but not in other possible worlds, are external to 
the universals that they relate. To put it otherwise, it seems that, in order to get the laws governing some 
given entities, all you should need is those entities themselves: just put them in any possible world, and 
their nomic behaviour is thereby determined – you get the laws “for free”, as it were. Dispositional 
essentialism seems to be able to account for this idea: on this view, things are dynamic, and they owe 
their behaviour entirely to themselves – the laws that things obey find their source in those things’ own 
natures. In a slogan, “things govern themselves”. I take this to be an important intuitive advantage of 
the essentialist approach. 
In the light of the above general context, I will now distinguish various brands of essentialism about 
laws, and comparatively assess them as potential best representatives of the essentialist approach. 
2.2. Varieties of Dispositional Essentialism about Laws 
Dispositional essentialism about laws may take various forms. I take the following idea to be a minimal 
common ground that all existing versions of essentialism share, and that arguably all potential versions 
should share to count as dispositional essentialist: the laws of nature distinguish themselves by finding 
their sources in the (dispositional) essences7 of some natural entities (e.g. kinds, properties)8 – i.e. by 
 
7 I put “dispositional” in brackets to remain neutral on whether all laws can be grounded in dispositional essences 
specifically. In particular, I do not exclude that (a) only causal laws are grounded in dispositional essences, and 
(b) at least some laws (e.g. laws of association) are non-causal (see e.g. Kistler 2005). 
8 I will be mainly interested in the question of what entities (e.g. fermions, mass, fields, all the fundamental natural 
entities, the world as a whole) serve as the essentialist sources and targets of laws. A further, ‘finer-grained’ 
question is what ontological category those entities belong to – are they e.g. properties, kinds, relations, individual 
objects, or tropes? Some versions of dispositional essentialism about laws operate at the level of kinds or 
properties, understood as Platonic universals (see e.g. Bird 2007; Tugby 2013), but other versions rather rely on 
Aristotelian, immanent universals (Ellis 2001; Mumford 2004), and there are also ‘trope’ versions (e.g. Molnar 
2003) and nominalist versions (see Whittle 2009; Vogt ms). In this paper, I focus on the former, ‘coarse-grained’ 
dimension (the ‘entity’ dimension) and leave the latter, finer-grained one (the ‘ontological category’ dimension) 
aside. The reason for this, besides considerations of space, is that it seems to me that the latter dimension may be 
less crucial with respect to the three criteria that I use here for my comparative assessment. Suppose, for instance, 
that fermions (in the ‘coarse-grained’ sense) are both the essentialist source and the target of the PEP as a law of 
nature. If so, I argue, then self-governance is fully preserved for this law – whatever stance one takes on the finer-
grained question. Yet, one may argue, on the contrary, that whether it is so also importantly depends on the 
ontological category that “fermions” is supposed to refer to. For example, on a Platonist version of essentialism, 
it might be that, after all, fermions are (partly) governed “from the outside”: what really does the governing is the 
essence of a transcendental entity (say, the Platonic property of fermionhood), which in turn can be seen as external 
to what is ultimately governed, namely concrete fermions (on governance and Platonist dispositional essentialism, 
see Tugby 2016). This is disputable: for instance, even accepting that what is ultimately governed is individual 
fermions, one may reply that, on the reasonable assumption that fermions essentially have this transcendental 
property, the essence of fermions somehow ‘includes’ (perhaps as a ‘mediate’ essence in Fine’s (1995) sense) the 
essence of that property, so that ultimately their nomic behaviour is still fully determined by their own essence, 
without the need for anything external; and as a result, self-governance is fully preserved. Moreover, even 
assuming that there is some sense in which, on e.g. a Platonist version of essentialism, self-governance may not be 
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being true in virtue of the essence of those entities. For instance, the Pauli Exclusion Principle (PEP) – 
which roughly states that no two fermions in a closed system can occupy the same quantum state at the 
same time – is a law of nature because it is true in virtue of the very essence of some natural entities, 
namely fermions (see e.g. Tahko 2015). By contrast, the true generalization that no gold sphere is more 
than 17 kilometres in diameter is not a law because it is not true in virtue of the essence of gold, or gold 
spheres, or anything else. There would be different ways to formalise this basic essentialist idea, but the 
following simple definition will do for our present purposes:  
 Essentialism about Laws (EL): For any plurality of natural entities xx, a generalization φ(xx) 
 about xx is a law of nature iff there is a plurality of natural entities yy such that φ(xx) is true in 
 virtue of the (dispositional) essence of yy (in symbols: yy: Nyy ˄ yy φ(xx)).9 
The varieties of EL that I will consider mainly differ with respect to what they take to be the sources of 
the laws (the yy’s in the above definition) and their targets, namely what the laws apply to (the xx’s). 
In the example of the PEP, at least according to the above description, both the essentialist source and 
the target are simply fermions (understood e.g. as a natural kind). As regards the essentialist source of 
the laws, one main distinction to draw is between local and global entities. I will call local entities all 
the entities that are “in” the world, or constituting the world – e.g. electrons, protons, electromagnetic 
fields –, as opposed the global entity, which is the world as a whole. Local entities are in fact those that 
most dispositional essentialists take to be the sources of all laws. Yet, mainly as an attempt to address 
the problem of “missing entities” described above, some essentialists have defended the view that the 
most general laws, and perhaps ultimately all laws, may be grounded in the essence of the world as a 
whole – more precisely, in the natural kind to which the actual world belongs. This brand of essentialism 
was mainly defended by John Bigelow, Brian Ellis, and Caroline Lierse (1992) (see also Bird 2005b: 
§7.2; Kistler 2005: 218, fn 27). I will call global essentialism about laws (GEL) the strictest version of 
this view, on which all laws are generalizations that are essential to the world as a whole.  
 Global Essentialism about Laws (GEL): For any plurality of natural entities xx, a 
 generalization φ(xx) about xx is a law of nature iff φ(xx) is true in virtue of the (dispositional) 
 
full, or fully direct, there still seems to be a clearer sense in which self-governance indeed fails to be preserved 
when the essentialist source and target of a law differ, not simply in the fine-grained way (e.g. fermionhood as a 
Platonic property or kind vs concrete fermions), but indeed in the coarse-grained way (e.g. fermions vs the plurality 
of all natural entities, or the whole world), or when, in addition to the essence of the entities involved (fermions, 
or fermionhood), an external law à la Armstrong is also needed to determine the relevant nomic behaviour. Thus, 
in general, whether or not the ontological category dimension matters for self-governance (and the other two 
criteria considered here), I am inclined to think that it may matter less anyway. All this would of course require 
more detailed discussion and argument, which I leave hopefully for further research. For the purpose of this paper, 
I will talk of entities (fermions, mass, the whole natural world) loosely, ignoring finer-grained distinctions. 
9 Essence here is to be understood broadly, in three respects: first, it may include, not only strict objectual essence 
(Fine 1994), but also generic essence (Correia 2006; Fine 2015); second, it includes, not only basic or constitutive 
essence, but also derivative or consequential essence (see Fine 1995; Correia 2012); finally, it may include both 
immediate and mediate essence (Fine 1995).   
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 essence of W (in symbols: W φ(xx)), where W is the natural kind to which the actual world 
 belongs. 
GEL is clearly a particular case of EL, with the additional condition that the essentialist source must be 
W (yy=W). For instance, on this view, the target of the PEP may still be fermions, but its essentialist 
source is W – the PEP is grounded in the essence of the world as a whole. 
By contrast, most dispositional essentialists think that all laws can be understood as essential to local 
entities, without the need for a global entity like W. I will call this view local essentialism about laws 
(LEL).  
 Local Essentialism about Laws (LEL): For any plurality of natural entities xx, a generalization 
 φ(xx) about xx is a law of nature iff there is a plurality of local natural entities yy (i.e. yyW) 
 such that φ(xx) is true in virtue of the (dispositional) essence of yy (in symbols: yy: Nyy ˄ 
 yyW ˄ yy φ(xx)). 
When appropriate, I will also consider the merits of a hybrid view, semi-global essentialism about laws 
(SGEL), on which some laws (general laws, e.g. perhaps conservation laws) need to be grounded in the 
essence of W, while the other laws (specific laws, e.g. perhaps the PEP) can be grounded in the essences 
of local entities. 
Up to now, I have distinguished forms of EL based on the essentialist source of laws. But I will also 
draw an important distinction based on a criterion that involves both source and target, and the relation 
between them. I will call coordinated essentialism about laws (CEL) the view that any law has some 
natural entities (local or global) as both its source and target:  
 Coordinated Essentialism about Laws (CEL): For any plurality of natural entities xx, a 
 generalization φ(xx) about xx is a law of nature iff φ(xx) is true in virtue of the (dispositional) 
 essence of xx (in symbols: xx φ(xx)).10 
CEL is also clearly a special case of EL (with the additional constraint that xx=yy). CEL is also what is 
often tacitly assumed by local essentialists – in the laws that they describe to illustrate their view, one 
and the same entity (e.g. electrons) often serves as both the target and essentialist source. Yet, in general, 
LEL does not entail CEL, no more than the other way around; they are just compatible – and the same 
goes for GEL and CEL. 
 
10 I am here taking about entities as the essentialist sources and targets of laws, and about the potential identity of 
these entities (xx=yy), in a rather loose, ‘coarse-grained’ sense (is it fermions, or electrons, or the world as a 
whole?). For simplicity, and although they may also play a significant role, finer-grained distinctions about 
ontological category (when talking about fermions, are we talking, more precisely, about fermionhood as a Platonic 
property, or as an Aristotelian property, or about individual fermions?) will be largely left aside in this paper – 
hopefully for further research (see also footnote 8 above). 
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Now, on what basis should we comparatively assess those brands of essentialism? As noted above, in 
the context of the more general debate about laws of nature described in §2.1, the most relevant criteria 
should have to do with the main distinguishing features of essentialism (whether its alleged problems or 
virtues). Some of those features will be less relevant to a comparison, because they will presumably be 
shared by any of the versions of essentialism distinguished above, and indeed any potential version of 
EL –  for instance, all will rely on a metaphysical background including fundamental dispositional 
entities, and all will explain the lawful regularities in the world in essentialist terms.  
By contrast, the following three criteria do not only play a crucial role in the general debate about 
essentialism and its rivals; they are also most relevant to a comparison between the various brands of 
essentialism distinguished above, as we will see. The first criterion is extensional accuracy. This 
obviously includes the requirement that the true generalizations coming out as laws on the theory should 
indeed be those that are laws, and vice versa – according to our common-sense, pre-theoretical intuitions, 
informed by science and scientific practise. In that respect, the problem of “missing entities”, supposed 
to pose a threat to essentialism, will be of particular interest. Yet, this is not enough: to be extensionally 
correct, a theory should also correctly describe the targets and sources of laws. In particular, it will not 
do, to ensure completeness, to invoke any arbitrary entity as the essentialist source of a given law: the 
entity should clearly be relevant and plausible as the source of that law – again in the light of pre-
theoretical, scientifically informed, intuitions. 
The second criterion concerns the modal status of laws, another crucial respect in which essentialism 
seems to distinguish itself from its rivals. On the one hand, many think that laws are not metaphysically 
necessary; on the other hand, essentialism is supposed to have the consequence that laws are 
metaphysical necessary – as we will see, things are in fact not that simple once we distinguish finer-
grained forms of essentialism. The third criterion that we will use concerns the idea of self-governance. 
As I said, essentialism seems to be well-suited to a picture of the world where things “govern 
themselves”, and I take this to be an intuitive advantage of this approach. Again, as we will see when 
drawing finer-grained distinctions within essentialism, not all essentialist views can preserve this 
advantage to the same extent. In sum, I will rely on the following three criteria: 
 (1) Extensional correctness: the generalizations that are laws according to the theory should 
 include all and only the generalizations that are laws on pre-theoretical, scientifically informed, 
 intuitions; moreover, the way laws are described on the theory – in particular, their proposed 
 sources and targets – should fit our pre-theoretical, scientifically informed, intuitions.  
 (2) Modal Status: the theory should attribute the right modal status to laws of nature. 
 (3) Self-Governance: the theory should preserve the key essentialist notion that things govern 
 themselves.  
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With this in place, we can now turn to our comparative assessment. Here is the plan for the remaining 
sections. In §3, I will focus on the source of laws, considering local essentialism (LEL) and global 
essentialism (GEL) – as well as semi-global essentialism (SGEL). In §4, the focus will be on the relation 
between the source and target of laws. I will show that, for the criteria considered – extensional accuracy, 
modal status, and self-governance –, what mostly matters, in fact, is whether essentialism takes the 
sources and targets to be coordinated or not, whatever those happen to be (local or global). Accordingly, 
I will consider coordinated essentialism (CEL), and argue that it is plausibly the best form of 
essentialism in those respects. 
3. The Source of Laws: Local versus Global Essentialism 
The main advantage that GEL is supposed to have over LEL concerns extensional accuracy (1), in 
particular completeness (the problem of “missing entities”). But the main proponents of GEL also claim 
an advantage with respect to modal status (2): GEL is supposed to avoid LEL’s consequence that laws 
are metaphysically necessary. In what follows, I question those two claims, and also argue that GEL 
may not be able to preserve the idea that things govern themselves (3).  
3.1. Extensional Accuracy: ‘General’ Laws and the Problem of ‘Missing Entities’ 
Common, local essentialism may be quite natural for various laws of nature: for instance, the PEP is 
true in virtue of the essence of fermions; Coulomb’s Law is true in virtue of the essence of electrons and 
other charged particles; Maxwell’s equations express the essential properties of electromagnetic fields. 
Prima facie, it may seem that, ultimately, all laws can be naturally understood as essential to some 
relevant local entities – entities constituting the world, or “within” the world. And this is indeed what 
most dispositional essentialists were tacitly assuming. Yet, this assumption has been questioned. It has 
been argued that some laws are in some sense too “general” to plausibly find their essentialist source in 
any particular local entities – thereby representing a threat to LEL’s completeness. This is what I call 
the problem of “missing entities”.  
For simplicity, I will call the allegedly problematic laws general laws, as opposed to specific laws (those 
that are quite naturally understood as essential to some local entities). The main candidate general laws 
discussed in the literature are probably conservation and symmetry laws, but examples also include 
universal constants and least action principles (see Bigelow et al. 1992; Fine 2002; Bird 2005b: §7.2; 
Kistler 2005: 218). For illustration, I will focus on the example of conservation laws. For the main 
proponents of GEL, conservation laws indeed provide the clearest illustration of why their account of 
general laws has an advantage:  
 Conservation laws … lend themselves exceedingly eagerly to our general analysis of laws. 
 Conservation laws do look, on the face of things, like descriptions of essential properties of the 
 world as a whole. It takes an effort to rewrite them in such a way that they sound as though they 
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 are describing correlations of some parts of the world with others. It takes somewhat less effort, 
 but some effort nevertheless, to rewrite conservation laws in such a way that they sound as 
 though they are describing essential properties of mere proper parts of the world. Yet if you take 
 conservation laws to assign essential properties to the kind of world we live in, then they can be 
 taken more or less at face value. They fall into place without rewriting. (Bigelow, Ellis & Lierse 
 1992: 386).  
More generally, in the literature, conservation laws (and corresponding symmetry laws) seem to be 
considered as the most characteristic problematic case for LEL – the one for which a globalist solution 
is most plausibly needed.11 Yet, even for those laws, though the globalist solution may be an attractive 
option, it is not the only one available to the essentialist.  
First, one may find their essentialist source in the essence of events, or processes. Bigelow, Ellis & 
Lierse (1992) suggest that events and processes are indeed what conservation laws are about (their 
target); but they argue that they cannot constitute their essentialist source: “It is not essential to the 
category of events that they should be energy-conservative, or angular-momentum-conservative, or 
conservative in any other respect. Changes which were not in accordance with these conservation 
principles would still be events.” (Bigelow, Ellis & Lierse 1992: 385). However, even assuming, for the 
sake of argument, that “event-like” entities failing to be energy-conservative are conceivable, and 
furthermore that this is enough to conclude that they are metaphysically possible, one may still resist the 
claim that those would really be events, rather than some similar, “event-like” entities. This sort of 
“Kripkean” move (Kripke 1980) is a quite common one for essentialists facing such objections: for 
instance, an essentialist would typically argue that, even if there may be possible worlds with bodies 
behaving according to an inverse-cube law of gravitation, those bodies would not have mass, but some 
mass-like counterpart, “schmass” (see Fine 2002, §2). 
Another local entity that may (perhaps more plausibly) serve as an essentialist source for conservation 
laws is the very sort of conserved quantity involved. This option may also face the objection that a world 
 
11 For instance, Bird (2005b) agrees that conservation and symmetry laws are ones for which a globalist solution 
may be needed, while he rather suggests localist solutions for other alleged problematic cases. For instance, he 
seems to agree that universal constants may not, at first sight, look like they are essential to some particular local 
properties. Yet, he suggests that, in fact, they may not correspond to fundamental laws; rather, they may ultimately 
be reducible to fundamental laws which, in turn, would be more easily understandable as grounded in the essences 
of local fundamental properties (see Bird 2005b: §7.2-(i)). He also suggests a localist answer for the least action 
principle. In this case, the objection is that such a principle seems to govern (“from the outside”) the evolution of 
a system from its initial state, rather than following from the essential properties of the initial state, as the 
essentialist would have it. In response, Bird (2005b: §7.2-(iii)) notes that this impression is based on the assumption 
that, starting from the initial state of the system, and given all its intrinsic properties, there is a multiplicity of 
possible evolutions or paths; then it is concluded that the least action principle is needed to explain why, among 
those possible evolutions, the system follows just one of them (in the case of a deterministic system). Bird 
questions the assumption that, given the initial state and its properties, there is a multiplicity of possible evolutions; 
although there is indeed a multiplicity of mathematical or logical possibilities for the evolution of the system, it 
may well be that the evolution “chosen” by the least action principle is in fact metaphysically necessary, and indeed 
flowing from the essence of the properties of the initial state.  
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where, say, the total energy of closed and isolated system is not conserved is conceivable. Yet, the same 
sort of Kripkean answer would be available to the essentialist. Thus, Max Kistler (2005: 218) argues 
that  
 it is constitutive for being the total energy-mass of a closed and isolated system to be conserved. 
 If some energy-like quantity of such a system is not conserved, we conclude that it is just one 
 form of energy, such as potential energy or kinetic energy, but not total energy. The law of the 
 conservation of total energy … is necessary because mass-energy and other fundamental 
 conserved quantities are conceptually linked to conservation. A property which exists in some 
 possible world but which is not conserved is not one of them. 
The legitimacy of such moves may be disputed; but it seems that it would be particularly difficult for 
the global essentialist to do so. This is because any essentialist, whether local or global, will presumably 
face analogous objections based on conceivable, allegedly counter-nomic situations; for instance, the 
global essentialist will face the objection that a world of the same kind as ours but with different laws 
(say, without the actual conservation laws) is conceivable. And it seems that the best way to answer this 
objection will be to deny that such a possible world would really be of the same kind as ours (unless she 
tries instead to deny that the situation is conceivable, or that this in turn justifies the claim that it is 
genuinely possible, but those alternative answers do not look very promising). It seems at least as 
legitimate to use this answer in the case of local entities like energy: something which would not be 
conserved in a closed and isolated system would be fundamentally different from the sort of thing we 
are used to in this world. It would not simply be total energy with some different properties, but indeed 
another kind of thing, with a different essence – even if perhaps “energy-like” in some sense. 
A different potential problem with the localist solutions considered here, especially the one taking events 
or processes as the essentialist source of conservation laws, is the following: such entities – compared 
to the typical entities which science deals with, such as fermions, electrons or spin – may seem in some 
sense too “general”, or not fundamental enough.  Yet, first, in the context of a debate between local and 
global essentialists, it seems that the latter could hardly claim to have an advantage in this respect: the 
world as a whole surely is a very general entity, and may not look like the typical fundamental entities 
that science deals with.12 Second, one way to avoid the problem would be to say that conservation laws 
find their essentialist source, not in events or processes themselves, but more precisely in the (less 
“general”, more fundamental) entities that constitute them – e.g. fermions, spin, and perhaps ultimately 
all fundamental entities. Note that, beyond conservation laws, this strategy, just like the globalist 
strategy, may be used as a general strategy to address all the alleged threats to LEL’s completeness: 
laws that seem too general, as they involve many local entities, perhaps all of them, can simply be 
 
12 On some (interpretations of) recent physical theories, in particular quantum mechanics, however, the 
fundamental level of the world does seem to consist in a global entity, rather than local ones – see the brief 
discussion of holism in §3.5. 
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understood as flowing from the essence of all those local entities, taken together. Thus, such a 
“collectivist” strategy, just like the globalist one, would ensure completeness; and it would do so 
appealing only to pluralities of familiar, local entities – without the need to introduce any unfamiliar 
global entity, such as the kind to which the world as a whole belongs.  
3.2. Extensional Accuracy: ‘Specific’ Laws 
I have argued that it is at best unclear whether GEL really has the advantage that it is supposed to have 
over LEL as regards conservation and other “general” laws: local solutions are also available, and they 
look at least as satisfactory. Moreover, global essentialism, in the extreme form of GEL, is not supposed 
to cover only the most general laws: it is also supposed to account for “specific” laws, namely those that 
seem to pose no threat to LEL. Indeed, the main proponents of the globalist strategy suggest that it 
should be generalized: “Conservation laws are not, however, the only laws which fall into place neatly, 
if construed as describing the natural kind to which the whole world belongs. We urge, in fact, that all 
laws of nature are best understood in this way.” (Bigelow, Ellis & Lierse 1992: 386). Yet, there seems 
to be no reason to apply the globalist strategy to laws that are naturally understood as essential to some 
local entities – e.g. the PEP is essential to fermions. Indeed, extensional accuracy is not only about 
providing some essentialist source for each law, but about providing a plausible and natural one. In that 
respect, GEL seems to have a disadvantage with respect to LEL: for specific laws, not only local entities 
are available, but they seem to be better candidates than the global entity (at least excluding scenarios 
where the world is “holistic” – see §3.5). 
An option for the global essentialist would be to use her globalist strategy only when necessary – i.e. 
restrict it to potential “general” laws –, while relying on local entities otherwise. This is the view I called 
semi-global essentialism about laws (SGEL). Indeed, perhaps for the reasons just mentioned, even the 
main proponents of the globalist strategy seem to be hesitant about adopting GEL or SGEL. Although 
they sometimes clearly suggest GEL, as in the passage quoted above, at other points they talk as if they 
were endorsing only SGEL – claiming, for instance, that Maxwell’s equations reflect the essence, not 
of the world as a whole, but of electromagnetic fields specifically (Bigelow, Ellis & Lierse: 383-4). 
SGEL may have the disadvantage of being less homogeneous. By contrast, GEL provides a very 
homogeneous account of laws, grounding all of them in one and the same global entity. Yet, GEL faces 
the objection that, for specific laws, this global entity seems unneeded, indeed inadequate – which may 
be more important than considerations of homogeneity. Thus, it might be that, overall, the globalist is 
better off adopting only SGEL. 
In sum, as regards extensional accuracy, it is at best unclear whether the globalist can claim to have any 
advantage. For specific laws, the globalist strategy seems inadequate; and it is not even clear whether it 
is needed for the most general laws, as reasonable local strategies are also available, and arguably 
preferable. Thus, at least based on the above discussion, it seems reasonable to conclude that LEL is 
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plausibly preferable to SGEL, and even more plausibly preferable to GEL. (Below I will briefly 
reconsider this comparative assessment on the assumption that the world is a “holistic” one, where local 
entities are in fact not (entirely) distinct and independent – see §3.5.) 
3.3. Modal Status  
The main proponents of global essentialism do not only claim to have an advantage with respect to 
extensional accuracy – criterion (1) –, but also with respect to modal status – criterion (2). The latter 
advantage relies on two claims: (a) laws of nature are not necessary in the strict, metaphysical sense, but 
only in the (weaker) sui generis sense of natural necessity; and (b) although laws do come out as 
metaphysically necessary on the common, local brands of essentialism, they do not on global 
essentialism (Bigelow, Ellis & Lierse: 373-4, 387).13 Claim (a), that laws are not metaphysically 
necessary, may of course be disputed: after all, the main argument against the necessity of laws relies 
on the possibility of scenarios where things seem to behave counter-nomically (e.g. electrons attracting 
each other); yet, as we have seen, a common, “Kripkean” answer is available to the essentialist (more 
on this in §4.2). But let us assume (a) for now and focus on claim (b).  
Common, local essentialism is usually taken to entail the metaphysical necessity of the laws: if, for 
instance, it is part of the essence of electrons that they possess (if they exist) the dispositional property 
of repelling other negatively charged particles, then they will have this property in any possible world 
(where they exist). Thus, the corresponding law of nature will be metaphysically necessary, i.e. true in 
all possible worlds (non-trivially so in worlds where electrons exist, and trivially so in the other ones). 
By contrast, on global essentialism, laws are supposed to have only a sui generis modal force, contained 
between mere contingency and strict metaphysical necessity. More precisely, this intermediate modal 
force is a form of conditional metaphysical necessity – necessity given this world’s belonging to the 
same natural kind as ours – for simplicity, we will call that kind “W”. For instance, as conservation laws 
are true in virtue of the essence of W, they are true, not in all possible worlds, but in those that are of 
kind W. This is, according to Bigelow, Ellis & Lierse (1992), why their essentialist view avoids the 
consequence that laws are metaphysically necessary.  
Thus, what is suggested is that laws are metaphysically contingent on global essentialism, while they 
are necessary on common, local essentialism. And still assuming that laws are contingent on pre-
theoretical considerations – claim (a) –, the globalist has a general advantage as regards modal status. 
Yet, things are in fact more complicated. The first reason is that, even assuming that the laws grounded 
in the essences of local entities are necessary while those grounded in the essence of the global entity, 
W, are not, a global essentialist might not be able to claim that laws are all contingent on her view: this 
 
13 Strictly speaking, Bigelow, Ellis & Lierse (1992: 373-4, 387) distinguish natural necessity from what they call 
“logical necessity”. Yet, I take it, the way they use this term in the context of their paper makes it quite clear that 
what they mean is indeed what we would now call “metaphysical necessity”, not logical necessity in the narrow 
sense of e.g. logical truth, or truth in virtue of the nature or definition of logical concepts. 
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will depend on whether, more precisely, she holds GEL or only SGEL. In the latter case, part of the 
laws, the “specific” ones, will have the exact same modal status as on common LEL, namely 
metaphysical necessity. This is an important point because, as we have seen, the main proponents of 
globalism are sometimes suggesting that they hold SGEL rather than GEL – and indeed, as I have also 
pointed out, they may have good reasons to do so, having to do with extensional accuracy.  
Moreover, besides the fact that global essentialism, as SGEL, cannot claim to avoid the consequence 
that (some) laws are metaphysically necessary, it would amount to a “hybrid” view of the modal status 
of the laws, where some laws are necessary and others are contingent. The issue would not simply be 
that the view is heterogeneous as regards modal status: after all, it is not that uncommon to think that 
different sorts of laws may have different modal forces (see e.g. Lange 2005, 2009; Tahko 2015). The 
problem is rather that, if the divide is between the most general laws, like conservation and symmetry 
laws, on the one hand, and the more “specific” laws on the other hand, one may rather expect that, if 
anything, the former, being more encompassing, and perhaps in some sense more fundamental, have a 
stronger modal status (see Lange 2005, 2009). Yet, on SGEL, it would be the exact opposite: “specific” 
laws, grounded in the essence of local entities, just as on LEL, would be necessary, while conservation 
and other general laws, grounded in the essence of W, would come out as contingent.  
Until now, I was tacitly assuming that, as the proponents of global essentialism suggest, the laws that 
are locally grounded are necessary, while the laws that are globally grounded are contingent – and that, 
consequently, whether all, some or no laws are necessary depends on whether LEL, SGEL or GEL is 
assumed. On the further assumption (a) that laws are in fact contingent, this implies, in particular, that 
GEL is preferable to SGEL, which is in turn preferable to LEL, as regards the modal status criterion (2). 
Yet, my second point is that the very claim that local source entails necessity and global source entails 
contingency is too hasty, indeed inaccurate. The modal status of laws does not only depend on whether 
their essentialist source is local or global: it also depends on what local source (if any) they are taken to 
have exactly, and on what target. On the one hand, even a law that is grounded in the essence of W may 
be metaphysically necessary. Indeed, this will be the case if both the source and the target of the law are 
taken to be global. The global essentialist takes conservation laws to have the whole world as their 
essentialist source. Those laws will then indeed be contingent provided that their target is taken to be 
some local entity like events or processes, or energy. Then, in worlds of another kind W*, conservation 
laws may not hold – depending on what local target we choose, this will mean that events and processes 
may fail to be energy conservative in such worlds, or alternatively that the total energy of closed systems 
in such worlds may fail to be conserved.  
By contrast, still assuming that conservation laws find their essentialist source in the world as a whole, 
it may then seem plausible that those laws also have the whole world as their target – that they describe 
the behaviour of the world as a whole. Indeed, the main proponents of global essentialism sometimes 
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seem to suggest such a view: when they say that laws, especially conservation and other general laws, 
are best understood as describing the essential properties of the world as a whole, it might suggest that 
what those laws apply to, the entity whose behaviour is described by them, is indeed the whole world. 
In any case, a view on which general laws (or perhaps even all laws) have the whole world as both their 
essentialist source and their target is an option that is available to the globalist. And on such a view, 
laws would be necessary, just as they are on common LEL. For if both source and target are the same 
global entity, W, it will not do to argue that the necessity of the law is conditional upon W’s existence, 
namely on the world’s being of kind W. That condition will trivially be met in all worlds where the 
target of the law exists, so that the law, describing the behaviour of that target, will be metaphysically 
necessary – true in all possible worlds (non-trivially so in those of kind W). Thus, contrary to what the 
main proponents of global essentialism suggest, attributing a global source to laws is not sufficient on 
its own to make them contingent. 
On the other hand, conversely, LEL does not by itself entail the metaphysical necessity of the laws. LEL 
is only the view that laws find their essentialist sources in local entities rather than in W. But this does 
not yet determine which local entities exactly. For instance, if a local essentialist claims that a 
conservation law has a local entity like energy (the total energy of a closed system) as both its source 
and target, then the law will be metaphysically necessary, for the reasons just mentioned. Yet, as we 
have seen earlier, it is in principle also open to him to claim that the target of a conservation law is a 
typical local entity (energy), while their essentialist source is, say, the plurality of all fundamental 
entities. In this case, the law may not be metaphysically necessary: if the law is essential, not to its target, 
but to a larger plurality of local entities (whose existence is not entailed by the existence of the target), 
then there may be possible worlds in which the target exists, but the essentialist source of the law does 
not, so that the target is not governed by the same law anymore.  
Thus, as regards modal status, global essentialism (whether as GEL or SGEL) cannot claim to have an 
advantage over LEL in principle, even on the assumption that laws are in fact metaphysically contingent. 
Things are more complex, depending on more that just whether the source of laws is local or global. 
Still, in practise, if we consider more specific versions of local and global essentialism, a comparative 
assessment is possible. In particular, if we compare a typical version of LEL (where every law has some 
entities as both source and target) to one of the most plausible interpretations of global essentialism as 
described by its main proponents (where all laws have a local target and a global source), then all laws 
will clearly be necessary on the former view, and contingent on the latter view. In this case, the globalist 
will indeed have an advantage on the localist as regards the modal status criterion (2) – at least on the 




Let us now consider our criterion (3): self-governance. As it will become clear, just as for modal status, 
whether things fully govern themselves or not depends on more than whether the sources of laws are 
local or global, so that comparisons between local essentialism and global essentialism as such, without 
further details, are difficult to establish. Yet, for illustration, we may again consider local and global 
essentialism in their most typical versions – LEL with every law having some local entities as both 
source and target, and GEL with all laws having local targets and the global source, respectively. Even 
assuming that laws are in fact contingent, and that therefore globalism has an advantage over localism 
as regards modal status (2), this advantage will come with a disadvantage as regards self-governance 
(3).  
For on the form of localism considered, all laws (general or specific) simply find their essentialist 
sources in the local entities that are also their targets. As a consequence, self-governance is clearly 
preserved: things govern themselves, and completely so – their behaviour comes entirely from their very 
nature. By contrast, on globalism, the source of the law is something over and above its target (i.e. the 
entities governed by the law), so that the latter is not (completely) self-governed: it is (partly) governed 
from the outside. Thus, the global essentialist cannot claim to have the relevant intuitive advantage over 
the Armstrongean anymore; at least this advantage is not so clear. For sure, even the brand of global 
essentialism considered here still differs from Armstrongeanism in important respects; in particular, it 
remains an essentialist account in that it takes laws to be true in virtue of the essence of some entity. 
Yet, it arguably loses some of the spirit of essentialism, which is that things essentially contain the 
source of their nomic behaviour, without the need for something external – whether it is “governing 
laws” or the essence of a global entity like W.  
In sum, just as for extensional accuracy (1), it is not at all clear that globalism can claim to have an 
advantage over localism as regards modal status (2) and self-governance (3). In all generality, no 
advantage can be claimed as regards (2) because modal status depends on more than just whether the 
source of laws is local or global. But even assuming, for simplicity, specific versions of local and global 
essentialism (the most typical ones) on which all laws are necessary on the former, and contingent on 
the latter, the resulting advantage of the latter view as regards (2) might be compensated by a 
disadvantage as regards (3), because things are fully self-governing on the former view, but not on the 
latter. Moreover, the advantage that global essentialism may have as regards (2) relies on the assumption 
that laws are metaphysically contingent on pre-theoretical intuitions – a claim that, as I have pointed 
out, is disputable, especially from an essentialist perspective (see §4.2 below). Thus, overall, at least 
based on the above considerations about (1), (2) and (3), global essentialism does not seem more 




The above discussion was based on the tacit assumption that our world is “atomistic”: roughly, that local 
entities (e.g. particles, fields) are distinct and largely independent from each other, and that smaller 
entities determine the larger entities that they compose (e.g. the plurality of all entities, the world as a 
whole), rather than the other way around. This assumption was particularly important when we 
considered ‘specific’ laws: I argued that the globalist could not apply her view to those laws (so that she 
could hold SGEL at most), because there was no reason why a specific law (e.g. the PEP) should be 
grounded in the essence of a global entity, rather than just the most directly relevant local entity (e.g. 
fermions). Yet, things may actually not be so simple: the world might be “holistic” instead. And if it 
were, this might bring some support to GEL. 
Holism may take various forms. For instance, on ontological monism, the world fundamentally consists 
in one single entity. On a less extreme form of holism, the world can be divided into distinct local things 
(e.g. physical systems), but those are significantly dependent on each other and on larger wholes that 
contain them. Such holistic scenarios may have some plausibility. Indeed, one may find some reasons 
to take some of them seriously in our best current physical theories, in particular quantum mechanics, 
characterized by relations of entanglement (see e.g. Calosi 2014, 2018; Ismael & Schaffer 2016). In the 
context of the present discussion, the most relevant holistic scenarios to consider will be those that might 
favour global essentialism even for “specific” laws. I will briefly consider two. 
One such scenario would indeed be ontological monism. If there is only one fundamental entity, then it 
seems that all laws will have to be ultimately grounded in the essence of this entity – or in the essence 
of the kind to which it belongs, W. What about the targets of laws? One way to go would be to say that, 
in such a scenario, the target of laws is also W, as the only fundamental entity. Note that, in this case, 
laws would preserve self-governance, and be metaphysically necessary for reasons explained above. 
Yet, another way to go would be to say that all laws have W as their essentialist source, but local entities 
as their target – as on the typical version of GEL. Local entities (e.g. fermions) may be seen as derivative 
entities – particular parts or “aspects” of the fundamental whole, W, that are “abstracted” from it. If laws 
have such local entities as their target, but W as their source, then it seems that self-governance will not 
be preserved, and that laws will be metaphysically contingent – as on GEL. 
However, there may be another way to look at such a scenario. Laws may instead be seen as also having 
a local essentialist source (at least an “intermediate”, as opposed to an ultimate, local essentialist source), 
thereby preserving self-governance and being metaphysically necessary – as on typical LEL. For local 
entities, on this scenario, are not simply nomically dependent on the global entity, W (in the sense that 
the laws applying to them ultimately depend on W); they seem to be indeed ontologically dependent on 
it. Their very essence depends on the essence of W, the whole from which they are only derivative or 
abstracted parts. And this (intermediate) essence may be used as the source of the laws applying to them. 
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For instance, the PEP is true in virtue in the essence of fermions – even if, ultimately, this essence is 
determined by the essence of W. In that sense, we preserve a form of self-governance, and the law is 
metaphysically necessary. For it would make no sense to say that, in another kind of world, W*, fermions 
would also exist but, being part of, or deriving from, a different whole W*, they would have a different 
essence – if they have a different essence, they are just not the same thing any more. In all the worlds 
in which fermions exist, they have the same essence (even if this essence is derived from the essence of 
a global entity), and they obey the same laws, which flow from this essence. Thus, even on a monist 
scenario, where there would be a unique global fundamental entity, W, a form of local essentialism 
about laws, which does not directly rely on the essence of W, may be preserved.  
Let us now briefly consider a different, somewhat less extreme form of holism: fundamentally, there is 
not just one global entity; rather, local entities (e.g. fermions) are distinct entities in their own right, but 
they are highly dependent on each other. In particular, we suppose that they are nomically dependent on 
each other – in order to determine the laws governing a particular local entity, you need to fix all the 
entities that there are. Such a scenario may seem to suit global essentialism in its typical form: laws have 
local entities as their targets, and they cannot simply be grounded in the essences of those targets; 
instead, they find their source in the world as a whole, W.  
A first question is whether we would really need the global entity, W, to ground the laws in such a case. 
After all, even if the laws applying to each plurality of entities are dependent on the plurality of all 
entities, we may indeed ground them in the essence of the plurality of all entities. Moreover, especially 
for an essentialist, who establishes a close link between the essence of a thing and its nomic or 
dispositional properties, it would be natural to understand the relevant dependence as ontological 
dependence: entities depend on all other entities for their very essence. Indeed, it is not uncommon for 
dispositional essentialists to think that fundamental entities (e.g. properties) form a web of 
interdependent elements, each getting its essence as a part of the structure (see e.g. Bird 2007b). And it 
is also the sort of essential dependence relations between entities that the main proponents of global 
essentialism (Bigelow, Ellis & Lierse 1992: 386-7) seem to suggest – except that, on their view, the 
essence of each entity is dependent on the essence of W as a whole, as opposed to the plurality of all 
entities.  
At first sight, this may seem useless: what essences do we need over and above the essences of all 
entities, taken together? And if nothing more is needed, why introduce such a global entity on top of all 
the local entities? I suggest that one reason might be the following. It might be that what determines the 
essence of each entity, as part of the web of all entities, is not only the essences of all those entities, but 
the fact that those entities are exactly the entities that there are. In possible worlds with all the actual 
local entities plus some other entities, the whole web would be different, and the actual entities may not 
preserve their place in the structure. Yet, arguably, the further fact that the actual entities are exactly the 
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entities that there are may not flow from the (derivative) essence of those entities, taken together. This 
might be one way to understand the essence of W, and how it brings something more than just the 
essence of all local entities: the essence of W contains, in addition, the fact that the local entities are 
exactly those that there actually are. 
Be that as it may, whether the ultimate source of the essence of each local entity is a collective essence 
or a global essence, that (intermediate) essence may be used as a source for the laws that have that local 
entity as a target. And on such a view, just as in our first holistic scenario, a local essentialist account 
could still be defended. On this account, laws would be necessary, and a form of self-governance would 
be preserved. In sum, at least based on this very brief discussion, it is not clear that LEL would be 
seriously threatened, even if monism or some other form of holism turned out to hold. 
4. The Source and Target of Laws: Coordinated versus Non-Coordinated Essentialism 
4.1. Source-Target Coordination and Extensional Accuracy 
One general lesson from the above discussion is that, whether as regards extensional accuracy (1), modal 
status (2) or self-governance (3), what matters is not simply whether the source of laws is global or local, 
but also their target, and the relation between their source and target – in particular, whether those are 
the same or not, namely “coordinated” or not. As regards (1), beyond finding a source for each law and 
avoiding the problem of missing entities, what also counts, for a view of laws to be extensionally correct, 
is whether it attributes a plausible source to them, as well as a plausible target. As regards (2) and (3), 
as the above discussion already showed, whether laws are metaphysically necessary and whether self-
governance is preserved clearly depend on both their sources and targets – and more specifically on 
whether they are coordinated or not (be they global or local). Thus, instead of focusing only on local vs 
global essentialism, it makes sense to also consider a different question – one that, to my knowledge, 
remains largely unexplored. Should a dispositional essentialist defend coordinated essentialism about 
laws (CEL)? In the rest of this paper, I will argue that CEL (whether local, global or semi-global) is 
indeed what an essentialist should adopt, based on criteria (1), (2) and (3).  
Let me first briefly consider (1). As regards completeness and the “missing entities” problem, it should 
be noted that CEL has an advantage over both LEL and GEL: it can rely on any entities, local or global, 
as potential essentialist sources. On the other hand, CEL is limited by a coordination constraint: can 
every law of nature, whether ‘specific’ or ‘general’, be plausibly understood as having some entities 
(whether local or global) as both its source and target? The above discussion already suggested a positive 
answer. As regards ‘specific’ laws, a local, coordinated essentialism is clearly the best way to go as 
regards (1), at least excluding holistic scenarios. And even for such scenarios, I have suggested some 
local, coordinated solutions. (Moreover, even if we assumed that those solutions do not work for some 
reason, and that grounding laws in the essence of W itself is inevitable, one may still argue that the 
relevant laws should accordingly have W as a whole as their target, yielding a global but still coordinated 
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solution.) As regards ‘general’ laws, we have seen that various local solutions are available. Some laws 
may have to be grounded in the essence of the plurality of all natural entities; and it seems that it would 
then be natural to also take this plurality as their target. For instance, if we take a conservation law to 
find its source in the essence of all local entities, as the ultimate constituents of events and processes, it 
seems natural to say that their target is also events and processes, and so ultimately all local entities. But 
I also suggested more typical localist solutions for general laws (e.g. energy as the essentialist source), 
and those were clearly coordinated. Thus, it may well be that no global entity is needed, even for general 
laws. (And again, even assuming that some general law most plausibly found its source in the essence 
of W, a global but coordinated solution, where the law governs the whole world, would still be 
available.)  
Thus, even if more would be needed to properly argue that CEL meets criterion (1) (at least as well as 
the main other brands of essentialism), it seems at least plausible. I will now focus on (2) and (3). 
4.2. Self-Governance and Metaphysical Necessity: A Dilemma for the Essentialist? 
That CEL fully meets criterion (3) should be obvious: the view is tailor-made for self-governance, and 
it is its most salient advantage. The real issue, then, is to what extent that clear advantage may be 
compensated by a disadvantage as regards modal status (2). Indeed, it is not only that laws having the 
same entities as both their essentialist source and target can be metaphysically necessary, as the above 
discussion illustrated: CEL indeed implies the metaphysical necessity of all laws – just as it implies self-
governance. To make it more precise, a sufficient condition for a law governing entities xx to be 
necessary is for it to be true in virtue of the essence of some entities yy whose existence is entailed by 
the existence of xx (e.g. yy is included in xx): in such a case, in all possible worlds where xx exists, yy 
also exists; and as it is essential to yy that the law hold if yy exists, the law will hold and govern the 
behaviour of xx in all possible worlds where xx exists. Thus, the law is metaphysically necessary, 
namely true in all possible worlds (trivially so in those where yy does not exist, which are also worlds 
in which xx does not exist). And this sufficient condition is trivially met for all laws on CEL, where 
xx=yy.  
Thus, on the assumption that laws are in fact contingent, the essentialist finds himself before a dilemma: 
two main desiderata, full self-governance and contingency, are just incompatible. Should the essentialist 
still hold CEL, preserving full self-governance at the expense of contingency? I will argue for a positive 
answer. The essentialist is not really faced with a dilemma, because (a) the metaphysical necessity of 
the laws should in fact not be problematic for the essentialist, and (b) an essentialist view where laws 
are contingent (such as typical GEL) may indeed lead to problematic consequences.  
As regards claim (a), as already pointed out, I think that the metaphysical necessity of the laws should 
not be such a bad consequence, especially for an essentialist. I suspect that the main reason why even 
some essentialists present it as a problem may be the following. The claim that the laws of nature are 
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metaphysically necessary – i.e. the laws hold in all metaphysically possible worlds – is ambiguous 
between two very different readings, which are often not clearly distinguished. First, the claim may 
mean the following: (i) For any natural entities xx, any actual law φ(xx) governing xx also governs xx 
in any possible word (where xx exists); thus, φ(xx) is true in all possible worlds (trivially so in worlds 
where xx does not exist). This is the sense in which I used the claim that laws are necessary in this paper. 
Now, there is a second sense, which is sometimes suggested by Bigelow, Ellis & Lierse (1992) (see also 
Kistler 2002; Fine 2005: 240, 242): (ii) The nomic behaviours of actual things are the same as the nomic 
behaviours of things in all possible worlds; one way to put it may be that there is a law φ(xx) governing 
some actual entities xx iff in any other possible world there is the same law φ(yy) governing some entity 
yy (perhaps xx=yy). Clearly, the two readings are different. In particular, to take a simple, toy 
illustration, a world where there is ‘schmass’, a mass-like entity behaving according to an inverse-cube 
law of gravitation, is metaphysically impossible if laws are metaphysically necessary in the sense of (ii), 
but not if they are metaphysically necessary in the sense of (i). 
As I said above, the best candidate argument against (i) is based on the conceivability of allegedly 
counter-nomic scenarios (e.g. one with electrons attracting themselves); and even granting that such 
scenarios are conceivable, indeed metaphysically possible, a common Kripkean answer is available: 
those would not be electrons, but ‘schmeletrons’. This common answer seems perfectly legitimate in 
general – e.g. it is one thing to conceive two entities attracting each other, quite another to claim to be 
able to conceive specifically two electrons attracting each other. And as I said, an essentialist in 
particular, whether local or global, should accept the legitimacy of this sort of move in general, for it 
seems that her view will somehow rely on it as well. Thus, understood as (i), the claim that laws are 
necessary should not be problematic, especially for an essentialist.  
On its second reading, (ii), the claim means that the set of nomic behaviours (laws) should be the same 
in all possible worlds. First of all, whether from a scientific or more general point of view, this use of 
the claim, “The laws are necessary” (or “The laws hold in all possible worlds”) is arguably less natural, 
and perhaps misleading: a law of nature associates a specific entity (or plurality of entities) with a 
specific behaviour, saying that if anything is (an instantiation of) this entity, it must behave in a given 
way – roughly, “Anything of this sort has that sort of behaviour”, rather than “There is that sort of 
behaviour” or “Some sort of things have that sort of behaviour”, or “Nothing has that sort of behaviour”. 
But let us put this issue aside to focus on the content of (ii). For instance, to use again our toy Newtonian 
case, (ii) excludes, not only a possible world where mass itself behaves according to an inverse-cube 
law of gravitation, but a world where any entity would behave according to such a law. Yet, it seems 
very difficult to resist the claim that such a world is conceivable. And although one may deny that 
conceivability systematically entails possibility, there seems to be no convincing reason to deny, in this 
particular case, the genuine possibility of the situation conceived – or so I will assume. Of course, the 
Kripkean move consisting in saying that the relevant entity is “schmass” rather than mass will be of no 
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help here; and it is difficult to imagine what else could save (ii) from such scenarios. Thus, the claim 
that laws are necessary in the sense of (ii) would indeed be much more problematic and difficult to 
defend than (i). Yet, this can hardly be taken to be a disadvantage of local with respect to global 
essentialism, or a problem for CEL: none of the brands of essentialism considered in this paper is 
committed to (ii). Indeed, to my knowledge, none of the main defenders of dispositional essentialism 
about laws holds that claim. What they typically say, and what CEL says in particular, is that an entity 
could not exist in another possible world and behave according to different laws; and this is perfectly 
compatible with the sort of counterfactual scenarios just considered.  
In sum, once we make it perfectly clear what the claim that laws are metaphysically necessary amounts 
to, it seems that it represent no serious threat: (i) is a reasonable consequence for an essentialist view, 
and the main sort of objections against it can be addressed convincingly; (ii) is much more problematic, 
but not a consequence of CEL.  
And there might be more: an essentialist view on which laws are metaphysically contingent, such as 
typical GEL (laws with W as their essentialist source and local entities as their targets) may lead to 
problematic consequences, which a necessitarian view such as CEL avoids – this was my claim (b). 
More precisely, (b) relies on the two following claims: (b1) On a contingentist essentialist view, like 
typical GEL, but not on a necessitarian view like CEL, natural existential claims, i.e. claims that such 
or such natural entity (e.g. electrons) exists, have the same modal status as laws of nature. Yet, (b2) On 
pre-theoretical intuitions, natural existential claims should not have the same modal status as laws of 
nature (i.e. they should not be naturally necessary, whether natural necessity is a special case of 
metaphysical necessity or not).14 Let us consider those two claims in turn.  
Earlier, I suggested that the essence of W may plausibly be understood as containing the essences of the 
various (fundamental) local entities, as well as the fact that those entities indeed exhaust the local entities 
that there are. As I said, the main proponents of global essentialism are not explicit about the exact 
content of this global essence, but it seems very reasonable to assume that it should at least include the 
fact that the world contains the natural entities that it actually contains. For if a possible world could 
contain no fermions, no mass, no spin, and instead contain all sorts of alien entities like ‘schmass’, and 
yet still be of the same kind as ours, W, then it would become very unclear to me what the notion of 
 
14 Fine (2002: §3) suggests that natural existential claims are indeed naturally necessary – more precisely, he 
mainly relies on the view that negative natural existential claims (e.g. “There is no schmass”) are, while here I will 
rather be interested in positive ones.  
Note also that I am only talking about unconditional existential claims (e.g. “There are fermions”), as opposed to 
conditional ones (e.g. “If there are entities of kind K, then there are entities of kind K*”). That some of the latter 
sort of claims may be naturally necessary (i.e. entailed by laws of nature) seems plausible. Indeed, some support 
for this view may be found in what Kerry Mckenzie (2017, forthcoming) calls a “Goldilocks Principle for 
Fundamental Kinds” – roughly, certain symmetry principles in (standard-model) physics at least partly determine 
the number and types of fundamental kinds (quantum fields) that there are. As far as I can see, such a principle is 
best understood as entailing at most the natural necessity of conditional existential claims – e.g. what kinds can or 
must co-exist, rather than some kinds having to exist or fail to exist unconditionally. 
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kind of world could even mean. Now, if the existence of a natural entity, say fermions, is essential to 
W, then the natural existential claim, p, that fermions exist will be true in all worlds of kind W. Thus, p 
will be metaphysically necessary conditional upon the world’s being of kind W. But this W-conditional 
metaphysical necessity is exactly the sui generis modal status that laws have on GEL, as we have seen. 
Thus, on this contingentist essentialist view, natural existential claims have the same modal status as 
laws (natural necessity). By contrast, on a necessitarian view like CEL, laws are simply metaphysically 
necessary (i.e. natural necessity is just a special case of metaphysical necessity), while natural existential 
claims are not – the property of behaving according to the PEP is part of the essence of fermions, while 
the property of existing is not. Thus, on CEL, natural existential claims have a different (weaker) modal 
status than laws of nature. 
This was for claim (b1). Now let me briefly argue for (b2), the claim that, on pre-theoretical intuitions, 
natural existential claims do not have the same modal status as laws of nature. The general motivation 
for this claim may be put as follows: intuitively, there is a sense in which fermions have to behave 
according to the PEP; but it does not seem that fermions have to exist – anyway not in that same sense. 
That sense is the sense of natural necessity (whether understood as a special case of metaphysical 
necessity, as on CEL, or as a weaker force, as on GEL). Indeed, a common way to characterize what is 
natural necessary is simply as what the laws of nature entail (see e.g. Hale 1996); and accordingly, what 
is naturally impossible is what the laws exclude. This view is intuitive and neutral, in that it does not 
depend on a particular account of what a law of nature is in the first place. And it makes it clear why, 
intuitively, it seems that fermions have to behave according to the PEP, while they do not have to exist 
in the first place. As the PEP is a law of nature, it is trivially entailed by the laws of nature. Equivalently, 
a situation where two fermions would occupy the same quantum state at the same time is naturally 
impossible, because incompatible with the PEP as a law. By contrast, it is difficult to see what law of 
nature would state or entail the existence of fermions. Equivalently, it is difficult to see why the non-
existence of fermions (or indeed the non-existence of anything, for that matter) would be incompatible 
with the PEP or any other law of nature. In a nutshell, natural necessity, the modality associated with 
the laws of nature (however those are accounted for), concerns how the natural entities must or can 
behave – not what natural entities there are in the first place.  
Let me finish by considering two rejoinders. First, one may argue that laws of nature, contrary to what 
I am tacitly assuming, are not telling us how certain specific entities must or cannot behave; rather, they 
are telling us what sorts of behaviours there must or cannot be in the world – e.g. the PEP tells us that 
there must exist some kind of entity such that two of them cannot occupy the same quantum state at the 
same time in a close system. As I said earlier, this alternative notion of a law of nature is sometimes 
used; and on this understanding, laws of nature would indeed entail natural existential claims. Yet, as I 
also said, this notion of laws seems mistaken, from both a scientific and a more general point of view. 
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The PEP, and any law of nature, tells us how a specific entity (e.g. fermions) must or cannot behave, or 
more generally what properties it must or cannot have – but existence is not among those properties.  
Second, one may agree that nothing in the content of laws of nature by itself entails the existence of any 
natural entities, but argue that such existence may still be derived from laws indirectly, based on 
considerations of relevance: a necessary condition for a generalization to be a law of nature is that it be 
relevant, i.e. governing existing, natural entities (as opposed to ‘alien’, merely possible ones). That a 
generalization about entities xx can only be a law of nature if xx actually exists is not something that I 
would deny – indeed, it follows from the definitions proposed in §2.2. For instance, even if it may be 
true that there is schmass in other possible worlds, and that it is always governed by an inverse-cube law 
of gravitation in those worlds, it would be strange to consider this law of schmass as a law of nature, 
precisely because it is not relevant to our natural world. Yet, all we can conclude on that basis is that the 
entities involved in laws actually exist – not that they must, as a matter of natural necessity. To get the 
latter claim, a further assumption would be needed, such as the following: natural necessity is subject to 
the S4 axiom (if p is naturally necessary, then it is naturally necessary that p is naturally necessary) – or 
alternatively, lawfulness is subject to an analogous iteration principle (if p is a law, then it is a law that 
p is a law). Then natural existential claims would come out as naturally necessary: if it is naturally 
necessary (a law) that a given generalization φ(xx) is a law, and still assuming that φ(xx)’s being a law 
entails the existence of xx (the relevance assumption), it indeed follows that the existence of xx is 
naturally necessary (a law). Yet, that further assumption about natural necessity (or lawfulness) is highly 
disputable (see e.g. Leech 2016). Intuitively, natural necessity (and laws) concern the natural world; 
they are about first-order natural facts or generalizations – not second-order facts about what 
generalizations are naturally necessary (or laws), let alone higher-order facts. 
In sum, it is not at all clear that CEL should be problematic when it comes to modal status (2), whether 
in general or compared to other essentialist accounts. The consequence that laws are metaphysically 
necessary, once the ambiguity about what it amounts to is resolved, is not that problematic, especially 
from an essentialist point of view – indeed, rival essentialist views on which laws are contingent, like 
GEL, may face resulting problems that CEL clearly avoids. Note that those considerations about modal 
status should also be taken into account in the comparative assessment of local and global essentialisms 
made in §3: now that the assumption that the contingency of laws is an advantage has been undermined, 
typical LEL (which is a special case of CEL, where every law has some local entities as both its source 
and target) may be (even) more clearly preferable to typical GEL.  
Going back to CEL, beyond modal status (2), we have seen that it is very plausibly satisfactory (as least 
as much as other essentialist views) as regards extensional accuracy (1). Finally, CEL, unlike the typical 
(non-coordinated) form of GEL in particular, ensures that full self-governance is preserved (3). At least 
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based on the above discussion in §3 and §4, we may reasonably conclude that, if one is to be an 
essentialist at all about laws, then one should probably be a coordinated essentialist.  
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, I discussed various forms of dispositional essentialism, differing with respect to what sort 
of entities they take to be the essentialist sources and targets of the laws. At least in the light of the above 
discussion – in particular §3 and §4.2 –, it is reasonable to think that one should probably be a local 
essentialist rather than a (semi-)global essentialist – despite, in particular, alleged problems concerning 
completeness and modal status. But, as I argued in §4, a more important question to be addressed, and 
which (to my knowledge) has been even more largely neglected, is whether an essentialist (whether 
local or global or semi-global) should be a coordinated essentialist – i.e. hold the view that the 
essentialist sources of the laws are always the same as their targets. I argued that the answer is plausibly 
positive. Beyond this internal comparison, given the position of the essentialist approach in the overall 
debate about laws (as briefly described in §2), and as my assessment was based on criteria that are 
directly relevant to that debate, the above discussion may reasonably be taken to bring some support to 
the more general claim that essentialism, as coordinated essentialism, can and should remain a serious 
candidate account of the laws of nature. 
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